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Abstract
Cooperation is ubiquitous in every level of living organisms.
It is known that spatial (network) structure is a viable mech-
anism for cooperation to evolve. Until recently, it has been
difficult to predict whether cooperation can evolve at a net-
work (population) level. To address this problem, Pinheiro
et al. proposed a numerical metric, called Average Gradient
of Selection (AGoS) in 2012. AGoS can characterize and
forecast the evolutionary fate of cooperation at a population
level. However, stochastic mutation of strategies was not con-
sidered in the analysis of AGoS. Here we analyzed the evolu-
tion of cooperation using AGoS where mutation may occur to
strategies of individuals in networks. Our analyses revealed
that mutation always has a negative effect on the evolution
of cooperation regardless of the fraction of cooperators and
network structures. Moreover, we found that mutation affects
the fitness of cooperation differently on different social net-
work structures.
Introduction
Cooperation is ubiquitous in every level of living or-
ganisms and has played an important role in the ma-
jor evolutionary transitions (West et al., 2015; Michod,
2007, 2006). In principle, cooperators benefit others
by incurring some costs to themselves, while defec-
tors do not pay any costs. Therefore, cooperation can-
not be an evolutionarily stable strategy for a noniter-
ative game in a well-mixed population (Nowak, 2006;
Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Taylor and Jonker, 1978;
Maynard Smith, 1982; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998).
In such a situation, spatial (network) structure is a vi-
able mechanism for cooperation to evolve (Nowak and May,
1992; Santos and Pacheco, 2005). However, until recently, it
has been difficult to predict whether cooperation can evolve
at a network (population) level due to the complex interac-
tions between evolution of strategies and topologies of net-
works. To address this problem, Pinheiro et al. (2012a) pro-
posed a numerical metric, called Average Gradient of Selec-
tion (AGoS), to characterize and forecast the evolutionary
fate of cooperation at a population level. AGoS can analyze
the dynamics of the evolution of cooperation in structured
populations even when nontrivial selection pressure is in-
troduced (Pinheiro et al., 2012b), when nonlinear imitation
probability is used (Dai et al., 2013), and also when struc-
tures and states of networks change over time (adaptive so-
cial networks) (Pinheiro et al., 2016).
In these earlier studies, however, stochastic mutation of
strategies was not considered. It is important to incorporate
such mutation because they frequently occur in real societies
and also because results obtained with stochastic fluctua-
tions of strategies would provide more robust observations
and conclusions. Here we analyze the evolution of coopera-
tion using AGoS where mutation may occur to strategies of
individuals in networks.
Model
We developed an agent-based model for the analysis of
AGoS. Individuals are placed on the nodes in a network and
they interact only with their neighbors. The networks used
in this paper are described in the next subsection. Each in-
dividual can take one of two strategies: Cooperation (C) or
Defection (D).
Once the composition of individuals in a network is given,
we can calculate the probability of increasing or decreasing
the number of cooperators by one, called Gradient of Se-
lection (GoS) at time t (Pinheiro et al., 2012a). Simultane-
ously, we can also update the strategies of individuals based
on the framework of evolutionary games at time t. Right af-
ter the strategy updating, mutation (flipping strategy from C
to D or vice versa) occurs with probability m. Therefore,
in evolutionary simulations, the calculations of GoS and the
strategy updating with mutation take place alternately in one
time step and these processes are repeated. The calculation
of GoS and the strategy updating with mutation are repeated
Λ time-steps. Figure 1 gives the flow of the model for each
simulation. Simulations are repeated Ω times in total.
Network structure
Pinheiro et al. (2012a) revealed that cooperation was sus-
tained in a network level and network structures led to the
different evolutionary results of cooperation. Following to
Figure 1: Flowchart of the model for each simulation r.
Simulations are repeated Ω times in total. AGoS is calcu-
lated by using those whole information.
the existing work (Pinheiro et al., 2012a,b), we focus on two
classes of network structures: homogeneous and heteroge-
neous. We use homogeneous in the sense that every indi-
vidual has the same degree. In the case of heterogeneous,
individuals can have different degrees.
For homogeneous networks, we use two types: homo-
geneous random networks (HR) (Santos et al., 2005) and
square lattice (Lattice). HR is created by randomizing links
from homogeneous regular ring networks. For heteroge-
neous networks, we use Baraba´si-Albert scalfe-free net-
works (BA) (Baraba´si and Albert, 1999). In BA, a small
number of nodes called hubs connect with a substantial num-
ber of links while most other nodes connect with a few
nodes.
In the initial setting, the number of cooperators in a popu-
lation, j ∈ [0, N ], is given to each simulation. The locations
of j cooperators and N − j defectors in a network are ran-
dom.
AGoS calculation
Once each simulation starts, GoS of the given population
at time t is calculated. If there is no population (network)
structure, the probability of the change of cooperators can be
Figure 2: Example of φi(t). In this case, the center individ-
ual i has ki = 6 neighbors and n¯i = 4 different strategies
in the neighbors. The probability that i (D) changes to the
other strategy (C) is φi(t) =
1
6
∑4
l=1 p(i, l). φi(t) can be
classified into two variables: φ+r (j, t) or φ
−
r (j, t). φ
+
r (j, t)
represents the change from defectors to cooperators. The
opposite case is represented by φ−r (j, t).
calculated analytically. However, in structured populations,
the calculation is difficult due to the complex connections on
networks.
The GoS gives the numerical solution for the evolution of
cooperation even in such a situation. Let φi(t) be the proba-
bility that i’s strategy changes to the other different strategy
(from C to D or from D to C). This can be the product of
two terms: the probability of selecting a neighbor with the
different strategy, n¯i
ki
, and the average probability that i im-
itates the different strategy, 1
n¯i
∑n¯i
l=1 p(i, l), where ki is the
number of i’s neighbors and n¯i is the number of neighbors
which has the different strategy opposite to i’s. p(i, l) is de-
fined in the next subsection. Thus, φi(t) can be defined as
follows. An example of φi(t) is illustrated in Fig. 2.
φi(t) =
n¯i
ki
1
n¯i
n¯i∑
l=1
p(i, l) =
1
ki
n¯i∑
l=1
p(i, l). (1)
From the definition, for a given simulation r, the prob-
ability to increase the number of C at j (the number of
Cs in the network) is φ+r (j, t) =
1
N
∑
i∈sD
φi(t) while
the probability for the decrease of the number of Cs is
φ−r (j, t) =
1
N
∑
i∈sC
φi(t), where N is the population size,
sD is a set of defectors (|sD| = N − j), and sC is a set
of cooperators (|sC | = j). Then, GoS at time t in a given
simulation r is defined as the difference between them, as
Gr(j, t) = φ
+
r (j, t)− φ
−
r (j, t). (2)
Finally, we obtain the Average Gradient of Selection
(AGoS) (Pinheiro et al., 2012a), which averages the GoS by
the number of time steps Λ and the number of simulations
Ω, as
GA(j) =
1
ΛΩ
Ω∑
r=1
Λ∑
t=1
Gr(j, t). (3)
Strategy updating with mutation
After the GoS calculation, the strategy updating takes place
as follows. In each time step, we randomly choose one in-
dividual i from the population. The individual plays the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game with its ki neighbors and
accumulates the payoffs resulting from the games. In each
game, both individuals obtain payoff R for mutual cooper-
ation while P for mutual defection. If one selects cooper-
ation while the other does defection, the former obtains the
sucker’s payoff S while the latter obtains the highest payoff
T , the temptation to defect. The relationship of the four pay-
offs is usually T > R > P > S in PD games. AGoS is used
for the other types of collective games including Stag Hunt
(Pacheco et al., 2009) and Snowdrift (Santos et al., 2012)
games.
Following the parameter settings used in the model by
Pinheiro et al. (2012a,b), we used P = 0, R = 1, and
S = 1 − T , while T > 1. The neighbors of i also play the
PD game with their neighbors and accumulate the payoffs.
Let pii and pil be the payoffs of individual i and l (one of the
randomly selected i’s neighbors), respectively. Based on the
framework of evolutionary games, higher fitness will be imi-
tated more. In order to realize this, we use the pairwise com-
parison rule (Traulsen et al., 2006, 2007; Szabo´ and To˝ke,
1998). Individual i imitates l’s strategy with the probability
p(i, l) = [1 + e−β(pil−pii)]−1, (4)
where β ≥ 0 controls the intensity of selection. For β = 0,
there is no selection pressure, meaning that evolutionary dy-
namics proceeds by random drift. As β becomes larger, the
tendency that strategies with higher payoffs will be imitated
increases.
In the previous studies (Pinheiro et al., 2012a,b), the next
time step immediately follows after the strategy updating. In
contrast, we incorporate mutation in this paper. Specifically,
the strategy of individual i changes to the different strategy
with probabilitym after the strategy updating. We focus on
how mutation alters fitness of cooperation in networks.
Results
In each simulation, we calculated the GoS and conducted the
strategy updating with mutation every time step, which was
iterated Λ = 105 time steps. The population was composed
of N = 1000 (N = 961 for Lattice) individuals and an
average degree was k = 4. The intensity of selection was
β = 10.0. We ran Ω = 30 × (N + 1) simulations in total
(we ran 30 runs for each j from j = 0 to j = N ). Thus,
we set Ω = 30030 for HR and BA while Ω = 28860 for
Lattice. The temptation to defect T was different depending
on networks. We varied the values of mutation probability
m as the experimental parameter.
Case of HR networks
We first see the results of homogeneous networks. Figure
3A shows the AGoS (GA(j)) on HR networks where the
mutation probabilitiesm are varied. Whenm = 0, the result
perfectly matches the corresponding case of Pinheiro et al.
(2012a).
It has two stable equilibrium points and two unstable equi-
librium points. One of the unstable points, xL, exists at
j/N = 0.039. One of the stable points, xR, exists at
j/N = 0.576. The other unstable and stable points exist
at j/N = 0 and j/N = 1, respectively. As the arrows sug-
gest, as long as j/N > xL, the population composition con-
verges to the stable point xR. Thus, unlike the case of well-
mixed populations, cooperation and defection can co-exist
in the network. In other words, from a global, population-
level perspective, HR networks can sustain cooperation even
though all individuals play PD. Asm becomes larger,GA(j)
goes down overall. Thus, the stable coexistence point xR
becomes lower. In the case of m > 10−2, we expect that
the only stable point exists at j/N = 0 because GA(j) is
always likely to be lower than 0, meaning that cooperation
can no longer exist. Therefore, mutation is always harmful
for cooperation although mutation is neutral itself.
Figure 3B shows the difference of GA(j) with mutations
on HR networks when we set the case of no mutationm = 0
as the baseline. Compared to the lower j, the higher j leads
to the lower GA(j) more as the mutation probability in-
creases. This is because, in the case of the higher j, clusters
of cooperators are easily destroyed by the mutation.
Case of lattice networks
Figure 4A shows the AGoS on lattice networks where the
mutation probabilities m are varied. The tendency of this
result is the same with the HR networks because lattice is
classified into homogeneous networks.
It has also two stable equilibrium points and two unstable
equilibrium points. One of the unstable points, xL, exists
at j/N = 0.068. One of the stable points, xR, exists at
j/N = 0.537. Hence, the density of co-existence is lower
than HR networks (0.537 < 0.576). The other unstable and
stable points exist at j/N = 0 and j/N = 1, respectively.
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Figure 3: (A) AGoS on homogeneous random networks
(HR). T = 1.005. HR has two unstable equilibrium points
(xL and 1) and two stable equilibrium points (xR and 0). (B)
Difference of AGoS from no mutation in HR.
If j/N > xL, cooperation and defection can co-exist in the
network. As m becomes larger, GA(j) goes down overall.
Thus, the stable coexistence point xR becomes lower. When
m = 10−2, the only stable point exists at j = 0. In this
case, cooperation finally converges to 0 (extinction) no mat-
ter the initial fraction of cooperators (j/N ) because GA(j)
is always lower than 0.
Figure 4B shows the difference of GA(j) with mutations
on lattice networks when we set the case of no mutation
m = 0 as the baseline. The value of AGoS is small in the
positive zone (GA(j) > 0) while the absolute value |GA|
in the negative zone (GA(j) < 0) is large when m = 0.01
(See Fig. 4A). In lattice networks, both cooperation and de-
fection are localized. Therefore, when the number of coop-
erators is low, only small clusters of cooperators can exist.
It is difficult for them to expand their regions because they
do not affect faraway places. In contrast, when the number
of cooperators is high, there can be some big cooperative
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Figure 4: (A) AGoS on square lattice (Lattice). T = 1.005.
Similar to HR, Lattice has two unstable equilibrium points
(xL and 1) and two stable equilibrium points (xR and 0). (B)
Difference of AGoS from no mutation in Lattice.
clusters. In this case, if mutation to defection takes place
in the clusters, it immediately changes cooperative clusters
to defectors. Thus, the absolute value of AGoS |GA| when
m = 0.01 in the negative zone may become large.
Case of BA networks
Figure 5A shows the AGoS on BA networks where the mu-
tation probabilities m are varied. When m = 0, there are
one unstable equilibrium point xL = 0.441 and two stable
equilibrium points, j/N = 0 and j/N = 1. This is the same
with the one observed in the previous study (Pinheiro et al.,
2012a). This means that cooperation becomes dominant
when j/N > xL. As m increases, the number of coop-
erators needed for sustaining the dominance of cooperation
becomes larger. However, it is still possible for coopera-
tion to become dominant even if the mutation rate is high
(m = 0.01) in BA networks.
Figure 5B shows the difference of GA(j) with mutations
on BA networks when we set the case of no mutationm = 0
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Figure 5: (A) AGoS on BA scale-free networks (BA). T =
1.25. Unlike homogeneous networks (HR and Lattice), BA
has one unstable equilibrium points (xL) and two stable
equilibrium points (0 and 1). (B) Difference of AGoS from
no mutation in BA.
as the baseline. Interestingly, mutation is especially harm-
ful for cooperation in the lower j in BA networks, which is
the opposite result compared to homogeneous networks (HR
and lattice). In the case of BA networks, cooperative hubs
surrounded by cooperators are robust to defectors’ invasion.
Thus, cooperation is not so affected when j is large.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the evolution of cooperation at a
population level in the presence of mutation by the AGoS.
We used two classes of networks: homogeneous (HR and
lattice) and heterogeneous (BA). Our analyses revealed that
mutation always has a negative effect on cooperation regard-
less of the fraction of cooperators and network structures,
because local clusters of cooperators can easily be destroyed
by mutation.
Interestingly, we found that mutation is particularly harm-
ful to cooperation when the fraction of cooperation is high
in homogeneous networks (HR and lattice), but so it is when
the fraction of cooperation is low in heterogeneous networks
(BA). This may be due to that hubs surrounded by cooper-
ators are robust to mutated defectors. If we assume aver-
age payoffs rather than accumulated payoffs as considered
here, we may have different results, as previously suggested
(Ichinose and Sayama, 2017). We also may have different
results when the game structure is different (e.g. the Snow-
drift game) even when the network structures are the same,
as Hauert and Doebeli (2004) have revealed.
These results indicate the importance of considering ran-
dom noise (mutation), which was largely overlooked in the
literature, in studying the evolution of cooperative behav-
ior in social networks. Mutation can be considered genetic
changes if we assume biological systems. If we assume cul-
tural systems, mutation can be considered a stochastic be-
havior to explore new behaviors. Although we showed such
a random exploration was harmful to keep cooperative soci-
eties, if we consider different forms of exploration, those ex-
plorations may work beneficially for societies, such as col-
laborative problem solving (Sayama and Dionne, 2015). We
would like to consider those cases in the future work.
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